Analysis of Operation Decision in Supply Chain Based on Asymmetrical Quality Risk

Abstract

Abstract: To analyze the supply chain operation strategy with product quality risk and transport service quality risk under the condition of information asymmetry, the supply chain operation decision model for a twostage supply chain consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer was developed. This paper assumes the environment that the manufacturer dominates the supply chain. Considering the influence of the market, the paper uses threestage dynamic game theory to study how the members of the supply chain constitute reasonable strategies to make sure that they can gain maximum profits themselves while facing the asymmetrical quality risk. Furthermore, this paper also illustrates the fluctuation of one member along with the changing of manufacturer’s strategy.

Key words: asymmetrical, quality risk, dynamic game theory, two-stage supply chain

CLC Number:

F224
F274

ZHOU Chao-Yun, LU Zhi-Qiang. Analysis of Operation Decision in Supply Chain Based on Asymmetrical Quality Risk[J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University, 2011, 45(12): 1782-1787.

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