Evolutionary Game Analysis on and Control Measures to the Exceeding Standard Problem for Electric Bicycle

Abstract

Abstract: Regarding different electric bicycle travelers as a homogeneous population, and each traveler as an individual with bounded rationality and learning ability, an evolutionary game analysis was given on the exceeding standard problem for electric bicycle. The research shows that when a travel mode choice game comes to an equilibrium, a certain kind of custom or convention will be formed simultaneously, and if the payoff matrix remains invariable, only a game with multiple equilibriums has the possibility to transfer from one equilibrium to another, which depends on the population’s initial state. Following the above analysis, some control measures were suggested. The application of evolutionary game theory and method of institutional analysis to the study of traffic customs and conventions can not only deepen the understanding of travel behavior, but also provide a theoretical basis for traffic policy formulation and implementation.

Key words: electric bicycle, travel mode, evolutionary game, customs and conventions

CLC Number:

C931

ZHANG Bo-1, 2 , JUAN Zhi-Cai-1. Evolutionary Game Analysis on and Control Measures to the Exceeding Standard Problem for Electric Bicycle[J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University, 2011, 45(12): 1788-1793.

References

［1］Fudenberg D, Levine D K. 博弈学习理论［M］. 肖争艳, 侯成琪译. 北京: 中国人民大学出版社, 2009: 14.

［2］卢现祥, 朱巧玲. 新制度经济学［M］. 北京：北京大学出版社, 2007: 119.

［3］汪洪涛. 制度经济学: 制度及制度变迁性质解释［M］. 上海：复旦大学出版社, 2009: 119.

［4］李振龙. 诱导条件下驾驶员路径选择行为的演化博弈分析［J］. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2003, 3(2): 2327.

LI Zhenlong. A study of route choice behavior of drivers based on the evolutionary game under the condition of traffic flow guidance ［J］. Communication and Transportation Systems Engineering and Information, 2003, 3(2)：2327.

［5］陈星光, 周晶, 朱振涛. 城市交通出行方式选择的演化博弈分析［J］. 管理工程学报, 2009, 23(2): 140142．

CHEN Xingguang, ZHOU Jing, ZHU Zhentao. Evolutionary game analysis of the travel mode choice for urban travelers［J］. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2009, 23(2): 140142.

［6］刘建美, 马寿峰. 基于有限理性的个体出行路径选择进化博弈［J］. 控制与决策, 2009, 24(10): 14501462．

LIU Jianmei, MA Shoufeng. Evolutionary game mode about individual travel route choice based on boundary rationality［J］. Control and Decision, 2009, 24(10): 14501462.

［7］Weibull J W. 演化博弈论［M］. 王永钦译. 上海: 上海人民出版社, 2006: 8799.

［8］于维生. 博弈论与经济［M］. 北京: 高等教育出版社, 2007: 225234.

［9］黄玉捷. 进化博弈视角下的制度分析理论［J］. 学术月刊, 2004(10): 6672.

HUANG Yujie. Theory of Institutional analysis in the perspective of evolutional game theory［J］. Research Journal, 2004(10): 6672.

[1]	QIN Chuang，FU Shuangzhi，JIN Xianlong，HOU Xinyi，QIU Zhong. Application of Combined Dummy Modeling in Two-Wheel Electric Vehicle Traffic Accident Simulation [J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University, 2019, 53(4): 447-453.
[2]	ZHANG Cheng (张诚). Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Closed-Loop Supply Chain Finance Risk Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and System Dynamics [J]. Journal of shanghai Jiaotong University (Science), 2016, 21(3): 355-364.
[3]	ZHANG Cheng (张诚). Research on Risks of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Online Confirming Storage Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and Subjective Bayesian Method [J]. Journal of shanghai Jiaotong University (Science), 2016, 21(2): 225-233.
[4]	XIE Fengjie. Incentive Mechanism for Cooperation in Evolution of Game Behaviors on Complex Networks [J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University, 2015, 49(08): 1256-1262.
[5]	ZHANG Chunhui,CHEN Jixiang . Evolutionary Game Analysis on Innovation Modes Selection: Absorptive Capacity Perspective [J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University, 2010, 44(12): 1657-1660.
[6]	XIANYU Jianchuan,JUAN Zhicai. Research on the Interdependencies between Trip Chaining Behavior and Travel Mode [J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University, 2010, 44(06): 792-0796.