Abstract: Traffic issues have always received enthusiastic attention from the society. To better simulate the traffic environment, we use the well-known snowdrift game (SDG). Punishment has been regarded as a significant method to promote cooperation. We propose a novel punishment mechanism and discuss its influence on the cooperation of the SDG. Considering that the snowball causes traffic jam, we add the role of the traffic police in the SDG. When the traffic police choose to cooperate, they have the right to punish the defectors. The scope of jurisdiction, the record of punishment and the method of deployment are decisive factors in deciding whether or not to punish the defectors and the severity of the punishment. Whether to sanction the defector and the severity of the punishment is jointly determined by the traffic police’s punishment record, jurisdiction, and deployment method. Through extensive simulation, we found that the difference between the two distribution methods becomes smaller as the jurisdiction becomes smaller. We need to choose the dominant distribution method based on the jurisdiction and the neighbor pattern. The results demonstrate that the punitive record, jurisdiction and distribution method all have an important impact on the SDG and traffic governance.

Key words: traffic police punishment mechanism, snowdrift game (SDG), cooperation

摘要： 交通问题一直受到社会重点关注，为了更好地模拟交通环境，采用了著名的雪堆博弈模型。惩罚一直被认为是促进合作的重要手段。提出了交警惩罚机制探究其对雪堆博弈中合作行为的影响。考虑到雪堆会造成道路拥堵，在博弈模型中引入了交警的角色。当交警选择合作策略时，他们对选择背叛策略的玩家进行惩罚。其中交警的管辖范围、处罚记录和分布方式是影响惩罚程度的重要因素，是否对背叛者惩罚以及惩罚的力度由以上三种因素共同决定。通过仿真实验发现：随着管辖范围越小，两种分布方式对合作行为影响的差异越小。交警的管辖范围、处罚记录和分布方式均对雪堆博弈中合作行为和交通管理有着重要影响。

关键词: 交警惩罚机制，雪堆博弈，合作