连续报价拍卖场景中有限理性智能体的研究

doi:10.1007/s12204-023-2681-0

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 关注于被广泛研究的连续报价拍卖场景。在这些场景中，拍卖者通常会先学习所有智能体的价值分布并将其作为先验信息，然后依照这一先验信息向每个顺序到来的智能体报出一个物品价格，智能体只能学则接受这个价格买下物品或放弃交易。如果拍卖者能正确学习到价值分布，每个智能体的占优策略就是说实话。然而，智能体存在操纵她的价值分布来剥削拍卖者的可能。研究了两个著名有限理性模型预测的理性智能体行为：阶层-k模型和认知阶层模型。首先分析了最优谎报分布的结构，然后对每个模型下的智能体给出了计算最优分布的算法。在连续场景中，通过一些例子表明两个模型都是定义不清的。此外，在不同数量代理人、不同最小单位价值和不同风险承受能力的离散场景中评估了两种模型。实验结果和对实验场景中贝叶斯纳什均衡的简要讨论表明，阶层-k模型和均衡都预言智能体谎报分布中概率会集中在其最高可能的价格。与之相反，认知阶层模型预言智能体谎报分布中概率会集中在低价格。阶层-k模型和均衡在某种程度上解释了在线市场中的“赢家诅咒”现象。然而，这些模型和均衡都不能解释同一物品在不同商店中可能有不同价格的现象。为了解释不同价格现象，建议尝试其他有限理性模型来表示智能体和（或）考虑具有有限理性的拍卖者。

关键词: 有限理性, 阶层-k 模型, 认知阶层模型, 连续报价拍卖

Abstract: We consider the well-studied sequential posted pricing scenarios. In these scenarios, an auctioneer typically learns the value distributions of all agents as prior information and then offers a take-it-or-leave-it price to each sequentially coming agent. If the value distributions are correctly learned, the dominant strategy of each agent is telling the truth. However, an agent could manipulate her value distribution to exploit the auctioneer. We study the behavior of sophisticated agents predicted by two prominent bounded rationality models: the level-k and the cognitive hierarchy models. We begin with analyzing the structure of the optimal reported distributions and then provide algorithms to compute the optimal distributions for each model. In the continuous scenarios, we show that both models are ill-defined by some examples. Moreover, we evaluate both models in discrete scenarios with different numbers of agents, different minimum units of the values, and different risk tolerances. The empirical results and a brief discussion about the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the experimental scenarios show that both the level-k model and the equilibrium suggest the highest possible prices. In contrast, the cognitive hierarchy model suggests low prices. The level-k model and the equilibrium somehow explain the “winner’s curse” in online markets. The models and the equilibrium fail to explain that the same item could have different prices in different shops. To explain the different-price phenomenon, we suggest trying other bounded rationality models for agents and/or considering the auctioneers with bounded rationality.

中图分类号:

TP18

. 连续报价拍卖场景中有限理性智能体的研究[J]. J Shanghai Jiaotong Univ Sci, 2026, 31(2): 390-404.

Huang Wenhan, Deng Xiaotie. Boundedly Rational Agents in Sequential Posted Pricing[J]. J Shanghai Jiaotong Univ Sci, 2026, 31(2): 390-404.

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