An Empirical Study on the Relationship between Stock Options Compensation and Risk of Chinese A-share Listed Companies

Abstract

Abstract: Using the sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2009, we make an empirical study on the relationship between managerial stock options compensation, investment risk and operating risk. We find that managerial stock options compensation, investment risk and operating risk have notably positive effects on each other. By introducing the concept of Vega, we indicate that the stock price volatility will increase the value of executives’ stock options, and reduce their risk aversion; thereby they will increase the company’s investment risk and operating risk. By controlling other factors and endogenous, we empirically prove the conclusion.

Key words: stock options compensation, investment risk, operating risk, endogenous

CLC Number:

F 224

LIU Yu-1, CHENG Dong-Quan-2, GU Feng-2. An Empirical Study on the Relationship between Stock Options Compensation and Risk of Chinese A-share Listed Companies[J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University, 2012, 46(09): 1516-1521.

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