上海交通大学学报(自然版) ›› 2012, Vol. 46 ›› Issue (06): 865-869.

• 无线电电子学、电信技术 • 上一篇    下一篇

对流密码算法LEX的差分故障攻击

张中亚,关杰   

  1. (信息工程大学 电子技术学院,郑州 450004)
  • 收稿日期:2011-09-08 出版日期:2012-06-28 发布日期:2012-06-28
  • 基金资助:

    通信保密重点实验室基金资助项目(9140C110202110C1101)

Differential Fault Analysis on the Stream Cipher LEX

 ZHANG  Zhong-Ya, GUAN  Jie   

  1. (Electronic Technology Institute, Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450004, China)
  • Received:2011-09-08 Online:2012-06-28 Published:2012-06-28

摘要: 基于面向比特随机故障模型对流密码算法LEX(Leak EXtraction)进行了差分故障攻击,得出:需要96对正误输出密钥流和232次计算或120对正误输出密钥流和216次计算可完全恢复128 bit初始密钥.结果显示LEX对差分故障攻击是不安全的.

关键词: 流密码, 差分故障分析, Leak Extraction(LEX)

Abstract: A differential fault analysis on stream cipher LEX (Leak Extraction) based on bit-oriented random fault model is shows that it needs about 96 pairs of correct and faulty keystream and 232 simple operations or 120 pairs of correct and faulty key-stream and 216 simple operations to recover all the 128 bit master key. The result shows that LEX is vulnerable to differential fault analysis.

Key words: stream cipher, differential fault analysis, leak EXtraction(LEX)

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