上海交通大学学报 ›› 2025, Vol. 59 ›› Issue (12): 1773-1783.doi: 10.16183/j.cnki.jsjtu.2023.643

• 新型电力系统与综合能源 • 上一篇    下一篇

面向现货市场的省间联络线功率考核机制与模型

陈子杰1, 宋柄兵2, 李语桐3, 王利峰2, 滕晓毕2, 严正1, 陈思捷1,4()   

  1. 1 上海交通大学 电力传输与功率变换控制教育部重点实验室, 上海 200240
    2 国家电网有限公司华东分部, 上海 200120
    3 上海交通大学 国家电投智慧能源创新学院, 上海 200240
    4 上海非碳基能源转换与利用研究院, 上海 200240
  • 收稿日期:2023-12-26 修回日期:2024-01-12 接受日期:2024-01-24 出版日期:2025-12-28 发布日期:2025-12-30
  • 通讯作者: 陈思捷 E-mail:sijie.chen@sjtu.edu.cn
  • 作者简介:陈子杰(1998—),硕士生,从事电力系统优化调度、电力市场和能源区块链研究.
  • 基金资助:
    国家电网有限公司华东分部科技项目(SGHD0000DKJS2310314);国家自然科学基金资助项目(52377112)

Inter-Provincial Tie-Line Power Assessment Mechanism and Model for Spot Market

CHEN Zijie1, SONG Bingbing2, LI Yutong3, WANG Lifeng2, TENG Xiaobi2, YAN Zheng1, CHEN Sijie1,4()   

  1. 1 Key Laboratory of Control of Power Transmission and Conversion of the Ministry of Education, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China
    2 East Branch of State Grid Corporation of China, Shanghai 200120, China
    3 College of Smart Energy, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China
    4 Shanghai Non-Carbon Energy Conversion and Utilization Institute, Shanghai 200240, China
  • Received:2023-12-26 Revised:2024-01-12 Accepted:2024-01-24 Online:2025-12-28 Published:2025-12-30
  • Contact: CHEN Sijie E-mail:sijie.chen@sjtu.edu.cn

摘要:

为了考核区内省(市)的联络线关口执行结果,我国已有多个区域电网引入控制性能标准(control performance standard,CPS),对改善省间联络线功率偏差和电网频率偏差起到了重要作用.然而近年在用电高峰月份,受端地区省(市)调频资源往往集体紧缺,省间电力现货市场价格高企.按较低固定价格计算CPS罚款的CPS考核机制已无法发挥短时功率平衡和频率兜底作用.为此,提出了网-省主从博弈模型,以求解使省调预留足够自动发电控制可调节容量的CPS考核价格:网调设定CPS考核价格,省调根据考核价格决策日前调度计划,网调再根据省调的调度优化结果调整考核价格,直至该省可调容量或频率偏差满足一定要求.算例结果表明,当考核价格取各类市场价格最高值的8倍时,考核机制可以激励省调在发电能力不足时购买省间现货电量和需求响应量,以满足最大预测负荷及可能的预测误差,从而将互联电网频率偏差控制在一定范围内.

关键词: 控制性能标准, 现货市场, 日前调度, 二次调频, 主从博弈

Abstract:

Multiple regional power grids in China have adopted the control performance standard (CPS) to assess the performance of inter-provincial tie-line operations, which has played a significant role in the reduction of both power deviation on inter-provincial tie lines and frequency deviation across the grid. However, in recent years, during peak electricity consumption months, the provinces in recipient regions often face a collective shortage of frequency regulation resources, while inter-provincial electricity spot market prices remain high. The current CPS assessment mechanism, which calculates CPS penalties based on a lower fixed price, has become ineffective as a safe guard for short-term power and frequency balance. Therefore, a master-slave game model between the regional dispatch center and provincial dispatch centers is proposed to determine the CPS assessment price that ensures sufficient reservation of automatic generation control (AGC) adjustable capacity. In this model, the regional dispatch center sets the CPS assessment price, and the provincial dispatch center responds by formulating day-ahead dispatch plan based on this price. The regional dispatch center adjusts the assessment price based on the dispatch optimization results of the provincial center until the adjustable capacity or frequency deviation of the province meets certain requirements. Case study results show that when the assessment price is set at eight times the highest value of various market prices, the assessment mechanism effectively incentivizes provincial dispatch centers to purchase inter-provincial spot electricity and demand response resources in face of generation shortage. This approach enables the system to meet the maximum predicted load and potential forecast errors, thereby maintaining the frequency deviation of the interconnected power grid within acceptable limits.

Key words: control performance standard (CPS), spot market, day-ahead dispatch, secondary frequency regulation, master-slave game

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