Transportation Engineering

Traffic Police Punishment Mechanism Promotes Cooperation in Snowdrift Game on Lattice

  • 祖金菁,向伟,康钦,杨航,王瀚程
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  • (Key Laboratory of Electronic Information of State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Southwest Minzu University, Chengdu 610041, China)

Received date: 2021-09-04

  Accepted date: 2021-12-12

  Online published: 2024-11-28

Abstract

Traffic issues have always received enthusiastic attention from the society. To better simulate the traffic environment, we use the well-known snowdrift game (SDG). Punishment has been regarded as a significant method to promote cooperation. We propose a novel punishment mechanism and discuss its influence on the cooperation of the SDG. Considering that the snowball causes traffic jam, we add the role of the traffic police in the SDG. When the traffic police choose to cooperate, they have the right to punish the defectors. The scope of jurisdiction, the record of punishment and the method of deployment are decisive factors in deciding whether or not to punish the defectors and the severity of the punishment. Whether to sanction the defector and the severity of the punishment is jointly determined by the traffic police’s punishment record, jurisdiction, and deployment method. Through extensive simulation, we found that the difference between the two distribution methods becomes smaller as the jurisdiction becomes smaller. We need to choose the dominant distribution method based on the jurisdiction and the neighbor pattern. The results demonstrate that the punitive record, jurisdiction and distribution method all have an important impact on the SDG and traffic governance.

Cite this article

祖金菁,向伟,康钦,杨航,王瀚程 . Traffic Police Punishment Mechanism Promotes Cooperation in Snowdrift Game on Lattice[J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University(Science), 2024 , 29(6) : 1116 -1125 . DOI: 10.1007/s12204-022-2533-3

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