上海交通大学学报(英文版) ›› 2014, Vol. 19 ›› Issue (2): 169-172.doi: 10.1007/s12204-014-1486-6

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A Standard Cell-Based Leakage Power Analysis Attack Countermeasure Using Symmetric Dual-Rail Logic

ZHU Nian-hao* (朱念好), ZHOU Yu-jie (周玉洁), LIU Hong-ming (刘红明)   

  1. (School of Electronic Information and Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200240, China)
  • 出版日期:2014-04-30 发布日期:2014-04-29
  • 通讯作者: ZHU Nian-hao (朱念好) E-mail:zhunianhao2005@163.com

A Standard Cell-Based Leakage Power Analysis Attack Countermeasure Using Symmetric Dual-Rail Logic

ZHU Nian-hao* (朱念好), ZHOU Yu-jie (周玉洁), LIU Hong-ming (刘红明)   

  1. (School of Electronic Information and Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200240, China)
  • Online:2014-04-30 Published:2014-04-29
  • Contact: ZHU Nian-hao (朱念好) E-mail:zhunianhao2005@163.com

摘要: Leakage power analysis (LPA) attacks aim at finding the secret key of a cryptographic device from measurements of its static (leakage) power. This novel power analysis attacks take advantage of the dependence of the leakage power of complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) integrated circuits on the data they process. This paper proposes symmetric dual-rail logic (SDRL), a standard cell LPA attack countermeasure that theoretically resists the LPA attacks. The technique combines standard building blocks to make new compound standard cells, which are close to constant leakage power consumption. Experiment results show SDRL is a promising approach to implement an LPA-resistant crypto processor.

关键词: correlation power analysis, cryptograph, differential power analysis, leakage power analysis (LPA), power analysis, simple power analysis

Abstract: Leakage power analysis (LPA) attacks aim at finding the secret key of a cryptographic device from measurements of its static (leakage) power. This novel power analysis attacks take advantage of the dependence of the leakage power of complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) integrated circuits on the data they process. This paper proposes symmetric dual-rail logic (SDRL), a standard cell LPA attack countermeasure that theoretically resists the LPA attacks. The technique combines standard building blocks to make new compound standard cells, which are close to constant leakage power consumption. Experiment results show SDRL is a promising approach to implement an LPA-resistant crypto processor.

Key words: correlation power analysis, cryptograph, differential power analysis, leakage power analysis (LPA), power analysis, simple power analysis

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