Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

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A Game Model of Information Disclosure Cheating in Securities Issuing

YANG Rong-guo WU Wen-feng   

  1. (Antai College of Economics & Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200052, China)
  • Received:2007-12-10 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2008-11-28 Published:2008-11-28
  • Contact: WU Wen-feng

Abstract: Securities issuing supervision is very important to the securities market development, and information disclosure is the center of securities issuing supervision, so how to assure issuer disclose the true information becomes main object of supervisor. This paper established a game model of securities supervision between issuer and supervisor and analyzed their optimum strategy. Some advice was given to reduce information cheating level and promote issuer to disclose true information.

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