上海交通大学学报

上海交通大学学报（自然版）

• 管理科学 • 上一篇    下一篇

企业控制权转让的最优时机与均衡价格

陈 珠 明
  

  1. (中山大学 管理学院， 广州 510275)
  • 收稿日期:2010-06-21 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2011-01-27 发布日期:2011-01-27

Optimal Timimg and Equlibrium Price for Control Rights Transfer of Company

CHEN Zhuming
  

  1. (School of Business, Sun Yatsen University, Guangzhou 510275, China)
  • Received:2010-06-21 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2011-01-27 Published:2011-01-27

摘要： 应用实物期权博弈论，定性给出了企业在信息不完美条件下控制权转让的均衡价格和最优时机的解析解，并对影响最优时机的主要因素进行分析.结果表明：在其他条件不变的前提下，目标企业的质量越好、并购沉没成本越小、控股比例越高、购买者期望协同效应越大及转让价格越低等，则均会导致控制权转让越快；而目标企业所处的产业增长率和波动率越高，则控制权转让越快，并具有双重效应.

关键词: 控制权转移, 实物期权, 最优时机, 均衡价格

Abstract: By applying real option game theory, an equilibrium price and optimal timing under the condition of nonperfect information for the controlling shares transfer were given, and the comparative static analysis was made for the main factors which affect the the optimal timing. The results show that, assuming other conditions remain unchanged, the better the quality of target companies, the smaller M and A sunk cost, the higher the percentage holding, the greater the expected synergies, the more low transfer price will result in the transfer of control sooner. The higher industry growth rate and the volatility, the faster the transfer of control, and there is a double effect.

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