基于博弈论的证券发行信息欺诈

上海交通大学学报（自然版）

基于博弈论的证券发行信息欺诈

杨荣国, 吴文锋

(上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院，上海 200052)

收稿日期:2007-12-10 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2008-11-28 发布日期:2008-11-28
通讯作者: 吴文锋

A Game Model of Information Disclosure Cheating in Securities Issuing

YANG Rong-guo WU Wen-feng

(Antai College of Economics & Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200052, China)

Received:2007-12-10 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2008-11-28 Published:2008-11-28
Contact: WU Wen-feng

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为确保在证券发行中信息披露的真实完整和及时有效,以减少证券市场的信息不对称，通过对证券发行市场的参与主体监管者和发行者之间建立博弈模型，分析了在不同环境条件下发行者的最优信息披露策略和监管者的最优惩罚水平，以达到在即定条件下各方效用的最大化，并对如何降低证券发行中的信息欺诈水平提出了一些建议，以提高信息披露的真实性，促进证券市场的健康发展.

关键词: 证券发行监管, 信息披露策略, 信息欺诈

Abstract: Securities issuing supervision is very important to the securities market development, and information disclosure is the center of securities issuing supervision, so how to assure issuer disclose the true information becomes main object of supervisor. This paper established a game model of securities supervision between issuer and supervisor and analyzed their optimum strategy. Some advice was given to reduce information cheating level and promote issuer to disclose true information.

中图分类号:

F 830.9

杨荣国,吴文锋. 基于博弈论的证券发行信息欺诈[J]. 上海交通大学学报（自然版）.

YANG Rong-guo WU Wen-feng . A Game Model of Information Disclosure Cheating in Securities Issuing [J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University.