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Evolutionary game on oil and gas companies’ pollution treatment

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  • School of Economics & Management, China University of Petroleum (East China), Shandong, 266580, Qingdao, China; School of Marxism, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai, 200052, China

Online published: 2025-06-27

Abstract

This paper presents a dynamic model of pollution treatment strategies, driven by the bargaining relationships between governments, oil and gas companies and local residents. The results show that government plays a dominating role and government environmental policies have significant impact on other two parties’ behavior. To achieve better pollution treatment in the future, we put forward the following suggestions. An improvement in the legal system is required, and the legal enforcement needs to be strengthened. In terms of pollution treatment, responsibilities and obligations of these three parties need to be clearly defined. A wellfunctioned reward and penalties system needs to be established for minimizing the environment damage in the future. © 2016, Shanghai Jiaotong University and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

Cite this article

Zhang T.; Guo C.; Quan L.; Fu F. . Evolutionary game on oil and gas companies’ pollution treatment[J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University(Science), 2016 , 21(6) : 750 -756 . DOI: 10.1007/s12204-016-1790-4

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