Articles

Simple Three-Party Password Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol

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  • (1. Department of Information Management, National Taiwan University of Science
    and Technology, Taipei 10607;
    2. Department of Information Management, Chinese Culture University, Taipei 11114)

Received date: 2011-05-10

  Online published: 2011-10-20

Supported by

the National Science Council (Nos. NSC99-2218-E-011-014 and NSC 100-2219-E-011-002)

Abstract

Abstract:  Three-party password authenticated key exchange (3PAKE)
protocol plays a significant role in the history of secure communication
area in which two clients agree a robust session key in an authentic manner
based on passwords. In recent years, researchers focused on developing
simple 3PAKE (S-3PAKE) protocol to gain system efficiency while preserving
security robustness for the system. In this study, we first demonstrate how
an undetectable on-line dictionary attack can be successfully applied over
three existing S-3PAKE schemes. An error correction code (ECC) based S-3PAKE
protocol is then introduced to eliminate the identified authentication
weakness.

Cite this article

LO Nai-wei (罗乃维), YEH Kuo-hui (叶国晖) . Simple Three-Party Password Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol[J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University(Science), 2011 , 16(5) : 600 -603 . DOI: 10.1007/s12204-011-1195-3

References

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