Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Closed-Loop Supply Chain Finance Risk Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and System Dynamics

doi:10.1007/s12204-016-1733-0

上海交通大学学报（英文版） ›› 2016, Vol. 21 ›› Issue (3): 355-364.doi: 10.1007/s12204-016-1733-0

Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Closed-Loop Supply Chain Finance Risk Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and System Dynamics

ZHANG Cheng (张诚)

(Finance School, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China; Management School, Hubei University of Arts and Science, Xiangyang 441053, Hubei, China)

出版日期:2016-06-30 发布日期:2016-06-30
通讯作者: ZHANG Cheng (张诚) E-mail:johncheng16@126.com

Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Closed-Loop Supply Chain Finance Risk Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and System Dynamics

ZHANG Cheng (张诚)

(Finance School, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China; Management School, Hubei University of Arts and Science, Xiangyang 441053, Hubei, China)

Online:2016-06-30 Published:2016-06-30
Contact: ZHANG Cheng (张诚) E-mail:johncheng16@126.com

摘要/Abstract

摘要： After building a dynamic evolutionary game model, the essay studies the stability of the equilibrium in the game between the commercial banks and the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) enterprises. By design of systematic mechanism based on system dynamics theory, capital chains of independent small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) on CLSC are organically linked together. Moreover, a comparative simulation is studied for the previous independent and post-design dependent systems. The study shows that with business expanding and market risk growing, the independent finance chains of SMEs on CLSC often take on a certain vulnerability, while the SMEs closed-loop supply chain finance system itself is with a strong rigidity and concerto.

关键词: evolutionary game, system dynamics, closed-loop supply chain finance (CLSCF)

Abstract: After building a dynamic evolutionary game model, the essay studies the stability of the equilibrium in the game between the commercial banks and the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) enterprises. By design of systematic mechanism based on system dynamics theory, capital chains of independent small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) on CLSC are organically linked together. Moreover, a comparative simulation is studied for the previous independent and post-design dependent systems. The study shows that with business expanding and market risk growing, the independent finance chains of SMEs on CLSC often take on a certain vulnerability, while the SMEs closed-loop supply chain finance system itself is with a strong rigidity and concerto.

Key words: evolutionary game, system dynamics, closed-loop supply chain finance (CLSCF)

中图分类号:

F 830

ZHANG Cheng (张诚). Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Closed-Loop Supply Chain Finance Risk Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and System Dynamics[J]. 上海交通大学学报（英文版）, 2016, 21(3): 355-364.

ZHANG Cheng (张诚). Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Closed-Loop Supply Chain Finance Risk Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and System Dynamics[J]. Journal of shanghai Jiaotong University (Science), 2016, 21(3): 355-364.

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Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Closed-Loop Supply Chain Finance Risk Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and System Dynamics

Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Closed-Loop Supply Chain Finance Risk Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and System Dynamics

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