节点电价机制并不能确保火电机组能够收回其启停和空载成本。近年来，由于新能源的大规模并网，火电机组的启停和空载成本回收面临着更加严峻的考验。为了应对这一问题，我国电力市场已经实施了两种火电启停与空载成本的补偿机制，但目前尚无学者研究这两种补偿机制对火电报价策略以及对全系统的发电充裕性、用电经济性、市场透明度的影响。本文结合我国电力市场的实际运行情况，首先介绍了全额补偿启停成本、补偿启停与空载成本至利润非负两种主流的成本回收机制，并提出了评价这两种机制的技术指标；其次，推导了这两种机制下火电机组的最优报价策略。计算结果表明，相对于全额补偿启停成本的机制，补偿启停与空载成本至利润非负的机制能降低火电机组报价的投机性、降低用户总支出，可以更好地保障电力系统的发电容量充裕性和经济性。

The locational marginal price mechanism does not guarantee that thermal power plants can recover their startup, shutdown and no-load cost, and in recent years, the large-scale access of renewable power plants has brought more severe challenges to the startup, shutdown and no-load cost’s recovery of thermal power units. For this reason, China’s power market has implemented two recovery mechanisms for thermal power plants’ startup, shutdown and no-load cost, but there have been no scholars who have studied the impact of these recovery mechanisms on the bidding strategies of thermal power plants and the generation adequacy, electricity economy, and market transparency of the power system. Based on the actual operation of China's power market, this paper first introduces and compares two mainstream recovery mechanisms: one that full compensates only startup and shutdown cost, and another that compensates startup, shutdown and no-load cost to non-negative profit, and proposes technical indicators for evaluating these two mechanisms. Secondly, the optimal bidding strategies of thermal power units under these two mechanisms are derived. The calculation results show that compared with the mechanism of full compensating only startup and shutdown cost, the mechanism of compensating startup, shutdown and no-load cost to non-negative profit can reduce the speculative nature of thermal power units’ bids, reduce the total user expenditure, and better protect the safety and economy of power system operation.