电动汽车（Electric Vehicle，EV）可以为电力系统的灵活运行提供重要支持，其中车网互动（Vehicle-to-Grid，V2G）模式是电动汽车参与电网调频调压的重要方式。然而V2G的市场化进程至今较为缓慢，缺乏有效的市场运行机制，使得大规模电动汽车难以参与到电网辅助服务。本文创新性地提出了一种电力监管部门、电力公司和电动汽车三方演化博弈模型，探究政-企-车各利益主体的策略选择对V2G市场运行的影响，以期找到促进V2G模式发展的长期演化的政府补贴机制和电价机制。为研究三方演化博弈中多个策略均衡点的稳定性，建立了该博弈的复制者动态方程，并利用李雅普诺夫稳定性理论分析了均衡点的稳定性，给出了促进V2G发展的补贴额度。最后，通过对我国上海市实际电价的仿真分析界定了可以促使电动汽车参与V2G模式的政府补贴系数区间和电价区间，为电力监管部门与电力公司制定补贴、定价策略提供理论支撑。

Electric vehicles (EVs) can provide significant support for the flexible operation of power systems. Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) mode is an important way for EVs to participate in the frequency and voltage regulation. However, the lack of an effective market operation mechanism makes it difficult for large-scale EVs to participate in the ancillary services of the grid. To clarify the effect of different policies on the V2G promotion, this paper proposes a novel evolutionary game model with the participation of the Electricity Regulatory Commission (ERC), Power Grid Company (PG), and EVs. The strategic choices of the ERC-PG-EVs are investigated together with their impact on the operation of the V2G market. Then, we identify the subsidy and pricing mechanisms for the government to facilitate the long-term evolution of the V2G. Moreover, the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is analyzed by the Lyapunov theorem. Finally, numerical results with real data verifies the effectiveness of the proposed method.