轨道交通列控系统共因失效分析

上海交通大学学报（自然版） ›› 2015, Vol. 49 ›› Issue (07): 1052-1057.

轨道交通列控系统共因失效分析

方云根,曾小清,王刚

（同济大学交通运输工程学院，上海 201804）

收稿日期:2013-12-05
基金资助:
同济大学“985”工程建设项目“轨道交通运行控制原型试验子系统”实验室建设(12375301/20120914531)，国家科技支撑计划“高速磁浮交通工程化集成系统研究”（2013BAG19B01）资助

Common Cause Failure Analysis of Automatic Train Control System

FANG Yungen,ZENG Xiaoqing,WANG Gang

(College of Transportation Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai 201804)

Received:2013-12-05

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

摘要：针对目前列控系统设计和开发过程中共因失效不易识别和评估问题，在分析列控系统失效特征基础上，通过建模和计算证明共因失效对于系统安全具有重要影响.采用系统安全理论，分析列控系统的共因失效影响因素，讨论共因失效的识别和筛选过程；基于列控系统3取2安全架构，计算包含共因失效的系统失效概率，指出由于缺乏历史统计数据造成共因失效定量计算的困难，最后提出控制列控系统共因失效的一般控制措施和方法.
关键词：共因失效；列控系统；失效分析；系统安全
中图分类号： U 463.1文献标志码： A

Abstract:

Abstract： Common cause failures(CCF) is not easy to be identified and evaluated in automatic train control(ATC) system design and development. The analysis of the failure characteristics of ATC system failures, system modelling and calculation demonstrated that CCF had a significant impact on the safety of the system. A CCF vulnerability factor was designed according to the system safety theory and the characteristics of the ATC system. Then, the process for CCF identification and screening was discussed. Based on the 2 out of 3 ATC safety architecture, the system failure probability which takes account of CCF was computed. It is found out that it is difficult to quantitatively calculate the CCF due to the lack of historical CCF data. Finally, the general CCF control measures was discussed and summarized.

Key words: common cause failure, automatic train control system, failure analysis, system safety

方云根,曾小清,王刚. 轨道交通列控系统共因失效分析[J]. 上海交通大学学报（自然版）, 2015, 49(07): 1052-1057.

FANG Yungen,ZENG Xiaoqing,WANG Gang. Common Cause Failure Analysis of Automatic Train Control System[J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University, 2015, 49(07): 1052-1057.

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