上海交通大学学报

上海交通大学学报（自然版）

• 管理科学 • 上一篇    下一篇

后股权分置时期大股东资产注入行为

唐宗明1，潘晨翔1，刘海龙1，姜克萍2
  

  1. （1. 上海交通大学 安泰经济与管理学院， 上海 200052； 2. 上海交通大学 财务处， 上海 200240)
  • 收稿日期:2009-10-30 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2010-12-31 发布日期:2010-12-31

Large Shareholders’ Behavior of Assets Injection Under the Postperiod of Split Share Structure Reform

TANG Zongming1，PAN Chenxiang1，LIU Hailong1，JIANG Keping2
  

  1. (1. Antai College of Economics & Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200052, China; 2. Financial Office, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200240, China)
  • Received:2009-10-30 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2010-12-31 Published:2010-12-31

摘要： 运用经济学优化方法及折现现金流方法，分析了大股东资产注入的内在激励.假设大股东注资后仍然发生掏空上市公司行为，通过求解大股东掏空超额收益及相关影响因素，分析了大股东资产注入动机.模型分析结果显示：① 大股东资产注入收益与其持股比例、注资规模、公司股票的市盈率成正比.② 上市公司营运效率高，注入资产若能产生协同效应，大股东将越有激励进行资产注入.③ 考虑到持股市值因素，大股东对上市公司掏空的边际收益下降，掏空激励减弱.④ 大股东掏空的超额收益与注资规模成反比，说明注资越多，大股东越不容易发生掏空行为.大股东优质资产注入体现了大股东对上市公司的支持，有利于上市公司绩效改善.

关键词: 大股东, 掏空或支持, 资产注入, 绩效

Abstract: This paper uses the economic optimal method and discount cash flow approach to explore the internal incentives of large shareholders’ assets injection. Then, assuming the large shareholders would tunnel the injected company, the paper analyzes the related factors of their net income of tunneling in order to disclose their motivation of assets injection. The modeling analysis shows that ① The profit of assets injection to large shareholders positively relates to the shareholders’ ownership, injection size, and priceearnings ratio of the listed company’s stock. ② The higher the operating efficiency of injected companies and the better synergistic effect of the injected assets, then the stronger incentives to asset injection from large shareholders. ③ Taking into account the market value of the share holdings, the tunneling incentives weaken. ④ Large shareholders’ tunneling proceeds are inversely proportional to injection size. So, the bigger injection size, the less prone to tunneling. Therefore, the assets injection itself induces the change of large shareholders’ behavior from tunneling to propping which will lead to a better firm performance.

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